Many African countries are now attempting to make a transition to democracy which will only succeed if they can institutionalize and neutralize the use of force. This study analyses the role of the military in democratic transitions by looking at the case of Uganda. Military power in Uganda has been used to destroy democratic institutions, while armed struggle has also been used to defeat autocracy, and is now directly involved in the creation of constitutional arrangements designed to neutralize the military as a political force. The author first examines the underlying principles which govern civil-military relations in modern State theory, and then the circumstances which allowed violence, institutionalized in official and unofficial armies, to become such an important factor in Ugandan politics for so many years. He reviews the role of the army under Obote (1962-1971), Amin (1971-1979), the second Obote regime (1980-1985), and Museveni. The situation since 1986 is considered with special reference to the role of the army in the north-south conflict and political reconciliation, the impact of military costs and demands on structural adjustment, and the mechanisms through which those involved in the constitutional reform process are attempting to establish the army’s political neutrality. Notes, ref.
