Bibliography

Par Inter Paribus: The Nature of Power in Cooperation. Lessons (for the United States) from the African Development Bank

The African Development Bank (ADB) was founded in 1963 as a regional development lending institution controlled and originally funded by its principal borrowers. Its unique history and structure have moulded this formalized international regime into an example and potential model of international cooperation in the absence of hegemony. The United States, a full member of the ADB since 1983, has failed so far to recognize the differences between the regime of the ADB and other similar development banks in which the United States holds a controlling interest. Through its unilateral behaviour in setting loan criteria from Washington, passing legislation which responds more readily to domestic concerns and interest groups than to the needs of the populations served by the multilateral banks and attempting to ‘teach’ development to less developed countries, the United States has demonstrated its lack of understanding that a new era has begun. This era is one in which the structural power of the United States is significantly weakened. The ADB serves as a clear example of how the United States has chosen to forego its due claim on relational power in favour of behaving as if the old rules were still in place. The result is that the United States is participating in the organization on even weaker footing than it would as a relatively strong but equal member of the bank. Notes, ref.

Title: Par Inter Paribus: The Nature of Power in Cooperation. Lessons (for the United States) from the African Development Bank
Author: Shaw, Christopher L.
Year: 1991
Periodical: African Affairs: The Journal of the Royal African Society
Volume: 90
Issue: 361
Period: October
Pages: 537-558
Language: English
Geographic terms: Africa
United States
External link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/722843
Abstract: The African Development Bank (ADB) was founded in 1963 as a regional development lending institution controlled and originally funded by its principal borrowers. Its unique history and structure have moulded this formalized international regime into an example and potential model of international cooperation in the absence of hegemony. The United States, a full member of the ADB since 1983, has failed so far to recognize the differences between the regime of the ADB and other similar development banks in which the United States holds a controlling interest. Through its unilateral behaviour in setting loan criteria from Washington, passing legislation which responds more readily to domestic concerns and interest groups than to the needs of the populations served by the multilateral banks and attempting to ‘teach’ development to less developed countries, the United States has demonstrated its lack of understanding that a new era has begun. This era is one in which the structural power of the United States is significantly weakened. The ADB serves as a clear example of how the United States has chosen to forego its due claim on relational power in favour of behaving as if the old rules were still in place. The result is that the United States is participating in the organization on even weaker footing than it would as a relatively strong but equal member of the bank. Notes, ref.