This article on civil-military relations in Ghana focuses on the experiences of the civilian government that came to power in Ghana in 1979 and was overthrown by the military at the end of 1981. In the aftermath of democratization in 1979 the Limann government made aggressive (and not always diplomatic) efforts to bring the armed forces under its control. In this instance both the civil government and the military command were threatened by the possibility of a coup from below and were anxious to prevent it. The analysis tries to answer the question of why the government and the military command failed to make common cause, examining first the conflict between civilian officials and the military high command over jurisdictional and other issues, and then the conflict between the security agencies themselves. It shows that the 1981 coup was the result of the double crisis of civil and military authority. Beset from the beginning by serious economic difficulties, eroding State structures, and political disillusionment, assailed from within by conflicts and weak leadership and from without by determined opponents, the fate of the Limann government and the democratic experiment was probably foreclosed from the beginning. Notes, ref., sum.
