This article examines state-led housing delivery in post-war Angola as an instrument of developmental patrimonialism. It draws on a growing literature on political settlements to highlight the role of rents, informal institutions, and power arrangements in managing political stability and economic growth. In the case of post-war Angola, key forms of rent distribution take place at the level of the presidency through the centralized use of actors and institutions that emerged historically outside of the ambit of regular government structures. These involve foreign business allies and special state agencies such as the state oil company Sonangol that respond exclusively to the Angolan president. While this has kept regular state institutions weak, the approach has been successful in terms of fast-tracking public investments that are important for rent distribution to key constituencies while keeping political competition at bay. The case of a resource-rich country such as Angola provides insight into the context-specific ways in which developmental patrimonialism translates into practice and the actors, interests, and institutions driving state-led housing delivery. Notes, ref., sum. [Journal abstract]
